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Abstract
Accountability, a cornerstone of contemporary education policy, is increasingly characterized by external monitoring and an 
emphasis on outcomes or results. Largely absent in discussions of accountability are the voices of stakeholders who work, 
learn, and teach in schools and other educational institutions. This article highlights the critical importance of structured 
democratic voice. This process involves enabling diverse education stakeholders to make use of organized opportunities to 
articulate their views, especially in discussions of planning and evaluation, in ways that their concerns are heard and valued. 
Using illustrative examples at the regional, national, and local level, this article discusses how structured democratic voice 
can help re-imagine approaches to accountability while strengthening the enabling environment, increasing trust in the 
system, and improving policy ownership. Notwithstanding the challenges of building local capacity and sustaining political 
commitment, this article highlights the important consequences of implementing a process of structured democratic voice: 
in particular, sustaining educational reforms over time and meeting ambitious collective goals in education.
Keywords Accountability · Structured democratic voice · Trust · Education reform · Enabling environment · Participatory 
governance
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Introduction
Accountability is a cornerstone of contemporary education 
policy. Some consider it a ‘virtuous practice’ (MacIntyre 
1984); others view it as indistinguishable from ‘good gov-
ernance’ and transparency (Bovens 2006; Dubnick 2014; 
Gorur 2017; Stensaker and Harvey 2011). Widespread inter-
est in accountability is reflected in research, where the use of 
the term increased tenfold in studies published between 1965 
and 2000 (Dubnick 2014). Accountability is also a buzzword 
in global education policy. For example, the Education 2030 
Framework for Action, passed by UNESCO member states 
in November 2015, refers to accountability—in the forms 
of ‘accountability,’ ‘accountable,’ or ‘to account for’—
more than 20 times (UNESCO 2016a). As Volante (2007) 
remarks: “[by] the early twenty first century it was clear 
that the application of accountability systems was one of the 
most powerful trends in education policy” (p. 7).
The emergence and spread of accountability are attribut-
able, in part, to five political and social trends (UNESCO 
2017). These global trends—namely, the massification, mar-
ketization, decentralization, standardization, and increased 
documentation of education—reflect the increased impor-
tance of education in society. The massification of education 
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is particularly important. As more and more students attend 
school, questions arise as to who is accountable for ensuring 
the quality of education provided. Primary school enrolment 
expanded notably in the latter half of the twentieth century 
(Dorius 2012), and grew even faster in the early 2000s with 
the impact of the Millennium Development Goals and the 
Education for All Goals. And while the global primary 
school age population increased by approximately 2% from 
2000 to 2015, the numbers of out of school primary age chil-
dren declined from 100.1 million to 61.0 million during the 
same period, resulting in an additional 52.5 million primary 
age children enrolled in school (Heubler 2008; UNESCO 
2016b). Yet with more children in primary school, interna-
tional donors are directing fewer resources to this schooling 
level, and aid to basic education fell steadily from its peak in 
2011 (GCE 2015; UNESCO 2016c). Concurrently, domes-
tic resources for basic education largely remained stagnant 
(Steer and Smith 2015). With resources decreasing and 
countries seeking greater value from existing allocations, 
many argued that accountability systems could improve 
resource effectiveness (Murgatroyd and Sahlberg 2016).
In this article, we argue that most accountability reforms 
in education do not achieve their intended impact and that a 
critical condition for strengthening accountability in educa-
tion involves providing different actors with an opportunity 
to articulate and represent their views as the accountability 
process enfolds. Drawing on literature about the importance 
of democratic voice and public participation, we refer to this 
process as structured democratic voice. Structured demo-
cratic voice involves organizing opportunities for diverse 
education stakeholders to articulate their views when poli-
cies are being planned and evaluated in ways that stake-
holder concerns are heard and valued. Through the provision 
of voice to citizens or their representatives, accountability 
approaches can be re-imagined and the policy enabling 
environment strengthened, resulting in increased policy 
ownership and more effective implementation. We start by 
examining two key characteristics of prevailing account-
ability systems: their reliance on external implementation 
and their focus on outcomes. This is followed by discus-
sions of the link between structured democratic voice and 
strengthened accountability, with illustrative examples at 
the regional, national, and local level. Themes in the cur-
rent accountability literature are then revisited in light of 
these examples. Specifically, we discuss how the inclusion 
of structured democratic voice can help overcome shortcom-
ings in dominant accountability approaches. The final sec-
tion highlights important implications of the arguments and 
evidence reviewed.
The global push to make education 
institutions accountable
In many respects, this is the ‘age of accountability’ since 
accountability permeates all social services, including 
education (Hopmann 2008). Power (2000), in laying out 
the ‘audit society,’ suggests that the explosion of audits, 
one indicator of increased accountability, was, in part, 
caused by a greater demand from citizens and tax payers 
for accountability and transparency of service providers. 
In practice this was reflected in the belief that “the pub-
lic has a right to expect that its resources are being used 
responsibly and that the public institutions are accountable 
for caretaking the public trust” (Supovitz 2009, p. 215). 
Crisis narratives around education and learning, which 
have gained momentum in recent years, have undermined 
public trust and apportioned blame to schools and teach-
ers. For instance, perceived poor performance on national 
and international assessments led the Ministry of Edu-
cation in Turkey to blame teachers for their inability to 
implement the new curriculum (Gür et al. 2012) and a 
government led task force in Pakistan to identify high 
teacher salaries as the crux of the problem (The Pakistan 
Education Task Force 2011). Additionally, sounding the 
alarm about an education emergency can push govern-
ments to act, often reinforcing desired policy. In Spain, for 
example, poor PISA results were used to further strengthen 
the government’s position on early school tracking (Bonal 
and Tarabini 2013).
Increased references to the ‘global learning crisis,’ in 
particular, suggest that earlier commitments to universal-
izing access to education are no longer valid or even mis-
guided. National and international policy makers should 
focus on ensuring good quality education, as measured 
by increased student learning (Ansell 2015). According 
to this prevailing narrative, national education systems 
must allocate more resources to measuring and monitoring 
learning and underscore ineffective practices among edu-
cation personnel, often portrayed as lazy or unmotivated 
(Alhamdan et al. 2014).
The elaboration of accountability mechanisms is a 
typical response to this narrative and involves two major 
aspects: first, the external monitoring of schools and 
teachers and second, a greater emphasis on outcomes or 
results. The growth of externally applied accountability 
is associated with the rise of managerialism, initially part 
of the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s (Hursh 2005). 
Managerialism supports efforts by external evaluators 
to increase cost-cutting and define clear standards. It is 
assumed that those providing services—teachers and, to 
a lesser extent, school leaders—need to be managed and 
to “demonstrate publicly that they fulfil accountability 
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requirements” (Larsen 2005, p. 300). Managerialism 
today, sometimes called new managerialism (Biesta 2004), 
is deeply rooted in an ethos of efficiency and performance. 
New public management, which highlights the adoption of 
private management practices in the public sphere, cre-
ates a quasi-market in education, reinforcing the author-
ity of managers over service providers and embracing a 
strong customer orientation (Simkins 2000). Drawing on 
neo-liberal economic theories, it sees education interac-
tions in transactional terms, and focuses on the benefits of 
marketization and privatization, in addition to increased 
performance measures and accountability (Tolofari 2005).
The application of accountability mechanisms, but-
tressed by managerialism, has eroded trust in the teaching 
profession in many countries (Fitzgerald 2008). In Japan, for 
example, externally imposed accountability and the intro-
duction of national testing in 2007 forced many teachers to 
reconsider their role and question the goals of teaching (Kat-
suno 2012). In South Korea, following the 2008 election of 
President Myung-Bak, a new education policy implemented 
in a top-down manner with little input from teachers and 
students resulted in considerable pushback (Kang 2012). 
This included protests by the Korean Teachers and Educa-
tion Workers Union:
Governmental policy makers wanted to show people 
the government’s big efforts to bring innovative change 
among teachers, but it has resulted in no positive fruit. 
Rather, those policies have played a role in breaking 
a cooperative culture among teachers (Comment by 
KTU, cited in Symeonidis 2015).
The proposed Korean policy to hold teachers accountable for 
their student test scores was similar to efforts in the United 
States under No Child Left Behind, in effect between 2002 
and 2017 (Chung and Chea 2016; Smith 2014). It required 
tests for all students in the third and eighth grades, as well 
as one grade in upper secondary education. Results were 
aggregated at the school level and made public with fed-
eral funding contingent on school performance (UNESCO 
2017). Contested by many in the education community, it 
was replaced by the Every Student Succeeds Act, which 
marginally reduces the amount of testing but largely main-
tains the push for test-based accountability. A similar with-
drawal occurred in South Korea after new leadership was 
in place and a report identified South Korean students as 
among the unhappiest students in OECD countries (Chung 
2017; Chung and Hong 2015).
Accountability also entails a shift from a focus on edu-
cational inputs and enabling conditions to one on outputs, 
outcomes, and results (Perie et al. 2007; Sahlberg 2009), in 
which external actors place responsibility for improved out-
comes on schools or teachers (Perie et al. 2007; Smith 2014). 
With the unprecedented spread of international, regional, 
and national assessments (Smith 2014; Kamens and Benavot 
2011), student test scores have become the preferred way 
to report on education outcomes, thereby establishing and 
legitimizing a ‘global testing culture’ (Smith 2016a). Using 
information from standardized assessments, authorities 
develop mechanisms for sanctioning or rewarding teachers 
and schools (Sahlberg 2010; Verger and Parcerisa 2017).
Monitoring learning through test scores and using results 
to drive policy reform are also practices supported by inter-
national organizations such as the World Bank, the OECD 
and, to a lesser extent, UNESCO (Benavot and Smith 2019). 
For instance, an analysis of terms associated with a testing 
culture or accountability found that they increased fivefold 
from one World Bank education sector strategy to the next 
(Joshi and Smith 2012). World Bank projects in education 
increasingly included financing for learning assessments 
between 1998 and 2009 (Benavot and Smith 2019). Among 
the most common policy solutions in the Bank’s knowledge 
products is performance-based pay for teachers (Fontdevila 
and Verger 2015). The prominent role played by test scores 
to assess quality creates a reality in which “testing has 
become synonymous with accountability, which becomes 
synonymous with education quality” (Smith 2016b, p. 7).
Structuring opportunities for all education 
stakeholders to be heard
Largely absent in discussions of quality or accountability are 
the voices and views of those who work, learn, and teach in 
schools. Few spaces are available for teachers, local lead-
ers, and students to articulate their concerns about policy 
initiatives or planned reforms. Structured democratic voice, 
as defined in this article, involves extending the work on 
democratic voice and public participation to education. 
MacDonald’s (1976) seminal work on democratic evalua-
tion differentiated democratic from bureaucratic and auto-
cratic evaluation, in part by the redistribution of power in 
decision making and instillation of mutual accountability 
in democratic evaluations. Drawing on this and related 
work, structured democratic voice focuses on the provision 
of organized opportunities for educators to have “a voice 
in decision-making” (Alsbury and Whitaker 2007, p. 165). 
This process seeks to include already established voices as 
well as those not regularly heard (Brown et al. 2015).
We suggest that structured democratic voice in education 
is most effective when multiple stakeholders—including par-
ents, teachers, students, and other community members—are 
able to articulate their views on policy planning and evalu-
ation in ways that their concerns are heard and valued. This 
mirrors the key principle in participatory democracy that 
“all parties should be included in reaching governing deci-
sions” (Ryan 2004, p. 449). Structured democratic voice can 
 W. C. Smith, A. Benavot 
1 3
be direct democratic voice—for instance, when citizens are 
invited to directly participate in policy planning through for-
mal consultations or conferences—or it can be representa-
tive democratic voice, when annual review processes include 
representatives who articulate the views of different stake-
holder groups. Structured democratic voice differs from less 
structured or unstructured processes such as parent surveys 
or public protests, which tend to be more temporary and 
reactionary approaches, and thus less sustainable.
Other terms in the education and accountability literature 
are related to structured democratic voice. Smith and Row-
land (2014) distinguish between tangential voice and infused 
voice. Tangential voice provides parents a one-time opportu-
nity to voice their opinion to education decision makers who 
hold complete authority. Infused voice involves input from 
parents who are able to “permeate every level of the educa-
tional process” (p. 101). Fox (2015) differentiates between 
tactical and strategic approaches to social accountability. 
Tactical approaches represent a single limited approach 
while strategic ones involve “citizen voice coordinated with 
government reforms that bolster public sector responsibility” 
(p. 352). The latter best resembles a diagonal accountability 
approach. A hybrid of vertical and horizontal accountability, 
the diagonal approach involves “direct citizen engagement 
with state institutions” (Fox 2015, p. 347). Thus, structured 
democratic voice is most closely related to infused voice 
and strategic diagonal accountability since it involves a 
coordinated approach that includes stakeholders in decision 
making at multiple points in the policy development and 
evaluation process.
Structured democratic voice seems especially pertinent 
if the task is to achieve ambitious national or international 
goals in education, since the responsibility for their achieve-
ment does not rest with a single individual or institution. 
Regardless of the overarching aim—whether to ensure inclu-
sive, equitable, and quality education; or develop employ-
ability skills; or create globally competent and culturally 
aware citizens—education is best understood as a shared 
responsibility (UNESCO 2017). Indeed, many actors and 
institutions play a critical role in achieving a broad edu-
cational vision. It is only through collective engagement 
that educational aims and policy goals can be achieved. 
Individuals cannot and should not be held solely account-
able for such shared responsibilities. Providing space for 
structured democratic voice highlights this shared respon-
sibility and the interconnectedness of actors. It also recog-
nizes that “accountability actions are part of a broader and 
longer process of engagement between actors and the state” 
(Dewachter et al. 2018, p. 168) and helps avoid incoherency 
across responsibilities while promoting ownership in the 
larger education goals (Fancy and Razzaq 2017).
Trust is vital in this process. It can influence the account-
ability approach chosen and its effectiveness. Trust in 
education can be seen as trust in the person, trust in the 
profession, and trust in the process (UNESCO 2017). In edu-
cation, trust in the person is generally widespread—parents 
are often supportive of their child’s teacher(s). Trust in the 
profession is more problematic and varies across countries. 
Just because parents (and others) value their local teach-
ers does not mean teachers, as a profession, are viewed as 
capable and trustworthy. Finally, among those being held to 
account, there must be trust that the process is fair and just. 
When people perceive the process as unjust or corrupt, com-
mitment to intended policy is adversely affected. Structured 
democratic voice can improve trust in the profession by rec-
ognizing the value of educators and by including them in the 
decision-making process. Structured democratic voice can 
also improve trust in the process if teachers and other edu-
cators feel their views and concerns have been heard. Col-
laborative processes, where all parties listen to each other, 
“can both build trust and create incentives for more voice” 
(Fox 2015, p. 356).
One avenue to increase trust involves the creation of 
shared aims and purposes. For example, higher education 
roundtables in the United States, supported by The Pew 
Charitable Trusts, brought government, business, civil soci-
ety, and education leaders together to discuss the aims and 
future agenda of higher education across the country (Burke 
2005; Nichols 1995). In North Dakota, this led to a flexible 
accountability program with broad support among leaders 
in government, business, and higher education and an agree-
ment to continue roundtable discussions to constructively 
address potentially conflicting views (North Dakota Univer-
sity System 2003). In Finland, education reforms in the late 
1970s, which resulted from extensive political consultations, 
led to greater local school autonomy. By the 1990s, a trust-
based school culture had taken root and teachers and prin-
cipals were given opportunities to participate in curriculum 
development and policy reform (Sahlberg 2007). The public 
lent support to the teaching profession and gave teachers the 
autonomy and discretion to deliver good quality education 
for the next generation. This abiding trust in teachers contin-
ues to be a crucial trademark of the Finnish education model 
(Auren and Joshi 2016).
By contrast, limited trust in the profession or the pro-
cess can undercut teacher engagement in decision making. 
In South Africa, lack of trust in teachers may help explain 
their limited involvement in the policy-making process after 
apartheid. Despite the transition to a more participatory gov-
ernment, teachers were often left out of education reform 
planning (Govender 2008). This may be due to frustration 
with a profession that benefited from political placements 
in top positions (Zengele 2013) and teacher unions that 
split over whether they wanted to maintain the inequitable 
practices of the past or push the progressive movement of 
the government (Govender 2015). In the end, teachers were 
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not included in the decision to implement outcomes-based 
accountability (Jansen 2002). In other studies, externally 
imposed and sanction-oriented accountability systems 
foster situations where educators feel threatened by exter-
nal actors making decisions beyond their control, thereby 
enhancing risk aversion and undermining trust (Sahlberg 
2009; Stensaker and Harvey 2011). Such situations can lead 
to a vicious cycle where low levels of trust result in more 
external, sanction-based accountability, which in turn further 
undermines trust.
Where there is trust, accountability improves
Trust is thus a kind of lubricant, a needed condition, in con-
texts where accountability operates. As seen in Fig. 1, efforts 
of education actors are influenced by the amount of trust pre-
sent, as well as the economic, political, and social context. 
The same accountability approach is unlikely to work well 
in all contexts or at all times. Country history and current 
circumstances should be considered when considering dif-
ferent accountability approaches. Within the context of SDG 
4, the challenge is getting various actors—government offi-
cials, teachers, school leaders, and others—to work together 
toward a shared set of targets. The interdependence of actors 
is illustrated in intersecting cogs or gears.
UNESCO (2017) identified four aspects of the enabling 
environment, represented by oil drops in Fig. 1. When 
the enabling environment goes unfulfilled, individual 
efforts are stymied. The enabling environment consists of 
resources, capacity, motivation, and information. Regard-
less of the ingenuity of the accountability approach, if 
actors lack key conditions, no approach will be effective. 
For example, for teachers to be held accountable for the 
quality of their instruction (an individual responsibility), 
certain conditions are crucial. Teachers must have
• pedagogical capacity (have they received the training and 
support to teach this group of students in this subject?),
• instructional resources (do they have all the necessary 
teaching materials and physical resources necessary to 
fully implement their pedagogical approach?),
• sustained motivation (do they feel their work is valued 
and appreciated?), and
• access to clear information (do they know what their 
responsibilities are and how to give an account for their 
actions?).
Beyond strengthening trust in the process and teach-
ing profession, structured democratic voice is likely to 
increase actor motivation and commitment. When actors 
can contribute to the accountability policies put in place, 
they are more likely to embrace them (Salmi 2009). Par-
ticipation in such a process increases actors’ sense of own-
ership encourages them to view policies as legitimate and 
the evaluation of their efforts as fair.
Having a voice in policy development also contributes 
to the information component of the enabling environ-
ment. Direct participation in policy creation allows actors 
to raise questions and concerns. It helps reduce confusion 
over individual responsibilities while minimizing overlap-
ping or duplicate work activities. With a fuller understand-
ing of their and others’ responsibilities, individuals are 
Fig. 1  Preconditions for suc-
cessful accountability in educa-
tion. Source: UNESCO (2017)
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more likely to accurately report on the tasks they perform, 
and feel fairly treated (Cerna 2014).
Structuring democratic voice in practice
While instances of structured democratic voice in educa-
tion are relatively rare, this section outlines several notable 
examples from which lessons can be drawn. These insights 
are especially pertinent in East Asia and other regions 
where citizens increasingly clamor for greater authority 
in decision making (Welzel and Dalton 2017). To begin, 
international organizations have increasingly encouraged 
democratic participation in education planning and evalu-
ation. For example, UNESCO’s International Institute of 
Educational Planning (IIEP) suggests that government and 
non-government stakeholders be represented in joint steer-
ing committees with formal power to appraise and approve 
education sector plans (IIEP 2010). The Global Partnership 
for Education (GPE) also supports civil society engagement 
through the creation of local education groups—in 2014, 35 
national coalitions reported engagement in such groups—
and, more importantly, through the establishment of Joint 
Sector Reviews (JSRs).
Over the past two decades JSRs have been used in the 
health and education sectors, aiming to promote country 
ownership and mutual accountability. Ideally, JSRs are 
meant to bring together representatives of government agen-
cies, donors, civil society, and other relevant stakeholders, 
on a yearly basis, to discuss and evaluate sector-wide pro-
gress, culminating in an annual report. This version of struc-
tured democratic voice is not without challenges. A recent 
GPE-commissioned evaluation of 39 JSRs held between July 
2014 and December 2015 highlights the fact that stakeholder 
participation is uneven (Martinez et al. 2017). The GPE 
report indicates that the Ministry of Finance was only pre-
sent in about 53% of the reviews. Parents’ associations were 
present in only one-third of the reviews; teachers’ unions in 
less than half of JSRs.
Another challenge is converting the presence of differ-
ent actors into exchanges in which all voices are heard and 
valued. In practice JSRs tend to be donor-driven initiatives, 
and discussions often limited to the effectiveness of donor 
investment or donor reports to the government (Holvoet and 
Inberg 2009). Other actors, including civil society repre-
sentatives, tend to take a back seat, viewing their role as 
observers rather than participants. The lack of active partici-
pation of all parties and an over emphasis on donor issues 
undermines the JSRs aim of fostering mutual accountability. 
The strong donor orientation may also limit a more com-
prehensive review of the education plan or system. Of the 
39 plans evaluated in the 2014–2015 period, only one-third 
of the JSRs adequately followed up on activities from the 
previous year (Martinez et al. 2017). If the national owner-
ship of JSRs is to improve they need less focus on donor 
concerns and more on planning and implementation issues.
Some countries in Latin America have provided oppor-
tunities for structured democratic voice. Examples include 
Colombia’s review of its National Development Plan (OECD 
2016) and Mexico’s independent election administration 
(Avritzer 2002). In Argentina, following a 2006 education 
law, The Confederation of Education Workers was formally 
included in the National Education Quality Council, thereby 
participating in efforts to plan policy and evaluate progress. 
In Uruguay, teachers overcame an externally imposed policy 
by mobilizing teacher unions to place representatives on the 
central education board (Gindin and Finger 2013). Unfor-
tunately, teacher union participation in education decision 
making is unusual—not only in Latin America, but in other 
regions. A recent survey of 70 unions across more than 50 
countries found that approximately three in five were never 
or rarely consulted on issues related to instructional materi-
als or pedagogical practices (Symeonidis 2015).
Brazil represents a well-established example of structured 
democratic voice in education planning. The 1996 education 
law called on the ministry to quickly formulate a decen-
nial education plan (Bodião 2016; de Andrade Tosta and 
Coutinho 2016). Beginning in 1997, the National Education 
Council, established by the National Congress on Educa-
tion, opened up a series of consultations with civil society 
organizations, professional associations, and specialists who 
helped develop national guidelines for education (Bodião 
2016: Federal Republic of Brazil 2014). During this period, 
participants from unions, academic institutions, scientific 
and student organizations, as well as organized social move-
ments, came together to establish the National Forum in 
Defense of Public Schools. This Forum led a democratic 
process in which the proposed education plan was drafted, 
and then eventually submitted to the government. The sub-
mitted plan was endorsed by over 70 parliamentarians in 
early 1998 and was in place from 2001 to 2010 (Bodião 
2016).
Drawing on insight from this process, Brazil’s ministry 
of education took the lead in developing subsequent plans, 
including the creation of municipal, state, and national 
conferences (Bodião 2016). These conferences encouraged 
dialogue between civil society organizations and the govern-
ment. More than 3 million people were involved in the entire 
process, including over 450,000 delegates. Central to these 
consultations was the Brazilian Campaign for the Right to 
Education, established in 1999, which currently includes 
over 200 groups, operating in 22 of 27 Brazilian states.
In 2010, the National Education Conference in Brazil 
developed final amendments to the reference document cir-
culated by the ministry and submitted the proposed plan to 
the House of Representatives (Bodião 2016). The national 
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conference, however, lacked actual authority allowing the 
House of Representatives to disregard some proposals and 
include others not discussed in the conference at all. The 
4 years between submission of the plan and its sign off by 
the President were marked by disagreements around public 
financing, specifically whether 7% or 10% of GDP should 
be allocated to education. In the year immediately following 
the plan’s submission, civil society groups took advantage of 
the call for amendments and submitted more than 2900 for 
consideration. Groups were further brought together through 
a media campaign titled PNE for Real, where members gave 
interviews, wrote articles, and held media events. This pres-
sure was outlined in a technical note, ‘Why 7% of GDP for 
education is not enough: Calculation of investments need for 
the new PNE to ensure a minimum quality standard.’ The 
note concluded that an additional 5.4% of GDP was neces-
sary, well above the government’s estimate of 1.9% (Bodião 
2016). The civil society campaign was partially successful 
as target 20 of the 2014/2023 PNE identified 10% of GDP as 
the investment goal by the end of the plan (Federal Republic 
of Brazil 2014).
In Africa, communities in Ethiopia and Malawi provide 
noteworthy examples of a partnership model, which builds 
government capacity while including community members 
in the problem identification and evaluation process. Sup-
ported by a civil society organization (CSO), the model is 
centered around a school performance appraisal meeting, 
which works within the government’s monitoring schedule 
to improve the capacity of those already tasked with data 
collection through targeted training. At such meetings, local 
authorities are trained on an integrated information system 
that provides input into electronic school report cards. The 
report cards then act as the primary prompt during the school 
performance appraisal meeting and are presented visually to 
ensure participation from those with lower literacy skills. 
The discussion culminates in a school action plan outlining 
how each actor can contribute to reaching the jointly identi-
fied goals (Visser et al. 2017).
In Wolaita Zone, Ethiopia, the final product included a 
Gender Action Plan with clearly delegated responsibilities 
for all, including the Girls’ Club Coordinator. Evaluations 
of the project found positive gains on girls’ attendance and 
their attitudes toward education (Link Community Devel-
opment 2017). An external, post-project evaluation found 
significant gains in achievement with decreased gender dis-
parity. Additionally, parents were more likely to encourage 
their daughters to attend and teachers improved their gender-
sensitive instruction over the project (Visser et al. 2017). 
Importantly, this was not a one-time CSO intervention. The 
sustainability of the approach is demonstrated in the con-
tinuation of school performance appraisal meetings in many 
participating schools. Such partnership arrangements, how-
ever, do not make then immune to fluctuations in funding. 
In Ethiopia, lack of financial resources was identified as the 
greatest threat to its longevity (Visser et al. 2017).
Obstacles to effective structured democratic 
voice
The three examples above reflect the challenges of imple-
menting structured democratic voice in practice. As seen 
in Fig. 1, accountability does not exist in isolation. Instead, 
mechanisms interact with, and are influenced by, the social, 
economic, and political environment. This suggests asym-
metry in application where no approach is expected to be 
universally effective. A recent review by Pagatpatan and 
Ward (2017), focusing on decision making in health policy, 
highlights possible challenges when considering structured 
democratic voice. In their evaluation of 77 articles, they 
identify four factors that underlie the effectiveness of pub-
lic participation: political commitment, partnership synergy, 
inclusiveness, and deliberativeness. Political commitment 
or political will is necessary in partnering with the public. 
It involves officials “ceding genuine voice to the stakehold-
ers” (Pagatpatan and Ward 2017, p. 522) within an envi-
ronment in which different viewpoints can be discussed 
openly. Additionally, resources are provided to help finance 
and sustain the accountability efforts while improving local 
capacity to ensure capable and informed democratic par-
ticipation. As seen above, political will can be partial or 
insufficient. In Brazil, voice without authority was provided 
for the national conference, undermining the effectiveness 
of structured democratic voice. While in Ethiopia, the gov-
ernment benefited from collaborative efforts to improve the 
education information system but seemed unwilling to pro-
vide the financial support needed to ensure their long-term 
sustainability.
Authoritarian governments are less likely to cede deci-
sion-making authority in education. While this has his-
torically been the case in many East Asian countries (e.g., 
Vietnam, Lao PDR, China), some have suggested a form 
of ‘soft authoritarianism’ where limited space for public 
intervention is provided in targeted areas. In a region pri-
oritizing economic growth over political freedom, public 
participation in policies related to economic prosperity is 
more likely (Chou and Huque 2016). Importantly, Chou and 
Huque (2016) suggest that increased use of structured demo-
cratic voice will help generate greater political will for such 
opportunities in the future.
Partnership synergy also influences the success of struc-
tured democratic voice. Synergy involves the ability of dif-
ferent groups to work together to reach a consensus. This can 
be difficult with a diverse group of stakeholders and requires 
a long-term relationship to build trust (Pagatpatan and Ward 
2017). Recognizing group plurality while highlighting 
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shared identity can help facilitate partnership synergy. Open 
discussions on locally relevant issues, in which individuals 
voice their concerns and propose ways forward, can help 
facilitate this. For example, efforts to eliminate child mar-
riage in Malawi were enhanced by meetings that allowed 
all community members to describe the factors contribut-
ing to the issue, before collectively outlining an action plan 
(UNESCO 2018).
Inclusiveness and deliberativeness are about who is 
included in the process and the quality of the dialogue. 
Without trust, inclusive participation and quality dialogue 
are less likely (Pagatpatan and Ward 2017). As noted in the 
JSR examples above, representation, even of key actors, can 
be uneven. Excluded groups or individuals may disengage 
if they believe their voices go unheard or make little dif-
ference (Madero and Morris 2016). Power dynamics can 
also play a role. For instance, the historical dominance of 
top-down decision making and economic reliance on donor 
financing likely contributed to the limited engagement with 
civil society in JSRs. Marginalizing some voices over others 
can lower the diversity and quality of the conversation and 
threaten the sustainability of the accountability mechanism.
Mexico City, which seeks to become the most envi-
ronmentally sustainable city in Latin America, adopted a 
15-year Green Plan during the Marcelo Ebrand Adminis-
tration (2006–2012) and promoted the role of sustainable 
democratic voice. Public participation was structured into a 
pre-launch consultation and a post-launch oversight board, 
which monitored, evaluated, and suggested improvements 
to the program. Representativeness was a concern through-
out. In the initial consultation only 5% of the city’s citizens 
participated. Board members raised concerns that NGOs, 
included to represent certain marginalized groups, were 
actually acting in their own self-interests. Furthermore, 
information about the plan and board’s decisions was only 
available on a website, although less than 30% of the pop-
ulation had internet access in 2010. Deliberativeness was 
also a concern as inaccurate or unreadable documentation 
undermined the quality of the board discussions. Lack of 
representation, dissatisfaction with pre-meeting reports and 
within meeting dialogue, as well as lack of political commit-
ment beyond the Ministry of the Environment contributed to 
high board member turnover. As individuals became disil-
lusioned with the process, a change in administration led to 
the demise of the program (Madero and Morris 2016).
Dominant models of accountability and their 
critics
Notwithstanding the challenges involved, two important 
implications emerge from instances of structuring demo-
cratic discussions in education policy and planning. First, to 
reach comprehensive education goals, such as increased or 
more equitable learning outcomes, there needs to be coher-
ence across actors and policies. This requires input from 
diverse actors at different levels in meaningful ways. When 
stakeholders are included in the creation and implementation 
of shared aims, they see them as pertinent to their commu-
nity. Furthermore, including individuals who have clearly 
identified responsibilities in teaching and learning is integral 
to converting policy intentions into practice and subsequent 
evaluation. Second, the inclusion of structured democratic 
voice in policy and planning processes reduces duplication 
of efforts, which can lead to fractured accountability. When 
an individual is held accountable for multiple tasks, pulling 
them in opposing directions, and diminishing their ability to 
fully complete any single responsibility, fractured account-
ability is like to occur.
To what extent have the dominant models of account-
ability in education incorporated these ideas and princi-
ples? Arguably, the most influential framework is the one 
advanced in the World Bank’s 2004 World Development 
Report (WDR). The 2004 WDR emphasized the importance 
of public services responding to the demands of local end 
users, advocated for greater decentralization and control—
and more accountability (World Bank 2003). The WDR 
accountability framework details relationships between 
clients, providers, and policy makers (Lateef 2016), and 
consists of two paths to accountability: the long route and 
the short route. The long route includes citizens influencing 
policymakers who would then have oversight authority over 
service providers. Providers would give an account of the 
action, not directly to the clients but to the policy makers. 
The World Bank made clear that this was the less desirable 
option. The large bureaucracy, and embedded politics, was 
expected to ground progress to a halt, making the govern-
ment largely unresponsive to citizen demands (Edwards 
2012). Even in a well-functioning system, the long route 
was seen as weak (Lateef 2016).
The short route was considered preferable as it gave direct 
authority to clients, allowing them voice and choice in pro-
viders (Lateef 2016). A key underlying assumption of the 
short route was that “transparency (access to information) 
combined with participation would lead to more account-
ability, which in turn would improve service delivery” 
(Dewachter et al. 2018, p. 159). With information in hand, 
clients would be conscientious consumers, rationally analyz-
ing the possibilities and switching providers when the analy-
sis deems appropriate. The expectation that clients engage 
as consumers was confirmed 10 years after the release of the 
2004 WDR when the report’s lead authors made clear the 
only option available in the short route, in their opinion, was 
market-based accountability (Lateef 2016). This clarification 
was not surprising and largely mirrors the shift in account-
ability relationships from a political relationship—where 
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citizens and the government work together for the common 
good—to an economic relationship—where taxpayers are 
consumers of services (Biesta 2004). In the latter relation-
ship, parents and teachers/schools are often pitted against 
each other, diminishing the potential for collaborative dia-
logue that would identify and remedy shared concerns.
A presumed advantage of the short route was its ability to 
overcome the principal–agent problem (Lateef 2016). This 
problem involves the ability of the client or principal (in edu-
cation often the parent) to have their needs met by the agent 
(in education, teachers are usually considered the agent). 
The agent is hired by the principal but misaligned interests 
and aims often lead to problems in efficiency (Smith 2017). 
According to the short route, teachers (the agent) should 
improve information available to parents (the principal), 
allowing for an evaluation of interests and potential sanction 
(perhaps in changing schools) in the event of misalignment. 
The expected result is the agents will correct their behavior 
to maintain their relationship with the principals. Local con-
trol, illustrated by the short route, has become a mantra in 
the accountability literature. Short route practices supported 
by the World Bank have influenced a wide array of inter-
national organizations including the Brookings Institution, 
GPE, UNESCO, and Save the Children (Edwards 2016).
Critiques of the 2004 WDR have questioned the dichoto-
mous presentation of seemingly mutually exclusive path-
ways. The short route and the long route to accountabil-
ity are intertwined and should not be viewed in isolation 
(Dewachter et al. 2018). The short route “needs the ‘long 
route’ of responsive elected authorities to work” (Fox 2015, 
p. 347). And, indeed, “accountability approaches effective 
in some contexts and some aspects of education may be 
detrimental in others” (UNESCO 2017, p. 7). Thus, adopt-
ing appropriate complimentary approaches leads to the best 
results (Dewachter et al. 2018).
By highlighting the importance of structured democratic 
voice, the shortcomings of both the short and long route 
become clear. As Dewachter et al. (2018) point out, the short 
route considers a limited range of actors and these actors are 
expected to work individually and independently from one 
another, leading the approach to discount the power of larger 
civil society. The assumed independence of individual actors 
creates a situation in which accountable parties are pulled in 
different directions, diminishing the time and quality of their 
efforts and leading to fractured accountability. In reviewing 
the principal–agent problem what was originally seen as a 
two-party relationship has been stretched to include multi-
ple principals (Fox 2015). In education, the assumption that 
these multiple principals represent a homogeneous set of 
interests (Fox 2015), and express similar demands from edu-
cators, is violated. The multiple principals demand different 
tasks from the responsible party (Lateef 2016), reducing the 
potential gains from accountability.
The long route to accountability advances a limited notion 
of who constitutes the government and, therefore, who has 
authority under this approach. The long route clearly sepa-
rates the governed (clients) from those that govern (poli-
cymakers), with the latter holding full oversight author-
ity. The long route fails to consider “other public ‘checks 
and balances’ institutions, such as legislatures, the judicial 
system, audit institutions, ombudsman agencies, or public 
information access reforms” (Fox 2015, p. 347). Common 
examples of accountability through the long route—namely, 
elections and protests (Lateef 2016)—are actually tempo-
rary in nature or limited to one-time, tangential voice (Smith 
and Rowland 2014). With structured democratic voice, the 
government cannot be clearly separated from the governed 
because the people are the government. With stakeholder 
voices included in policy planning and evaluation, they have 
authority to help reconsider and reform an education system.
Structured democratic voice is, therefore, best represented 
in a revised long-route approach, involving three elements 
(Dewachter et al. 2018). The traditional view of the long 
route is laid out as political accountability, where authority 
remains in the hands of policymakers. Added to this are 
citizen-led and civil society-led social accountability. Social 
accountability, although typically associated with the short 
route, is placed here as citizens are invited into governance 
space. Citizen-led social accountability decreases the dis-
tance between the governed and government, providing for 
direct interaction between citizens and policymakers, medi-
ated by a civil society organization. In both types of social 
accountability, citizens retain some decision-making author-
ity. The former could be accomplished through a form of 
structured direct democratic voice, while the latter would 
likely involve a form of structured representative democratic 
voice.
Concluding remarks
The introduction of externally driven, results-oriented 
accountability in education has fostered unwanted competi-
tion and undermined trust. It has done little to raise learning 
levels or reduce disparities and equity gaps (Lingard et al. 
2017; Smith 2016c; UNESCO 2017). Notwithstanding the 
challenges of creating and implementing internally focused 
accountability systems, based on shared responsibility and 
actively engaged stakeholders, such systems are more likely 
to contribute to real gains in education, including progress 
on ambitious education targets (Fullan 2011). This paper 
argues that structured democratic voice is a key component 
of effective accountability. When multi-party deliberations 
are applied to education, their impact is palpable: better 
aligned and consensual aims, less reliance on temporary 
responses by strongly vested actors, and accountability 
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which is less fractured and more coherent. Creating plat-
forms for democratic voice in education planning and policy 
makes accountability practices less susceptible to external 
shocks and political whims.
Structured democratic voice is nurtured in organized 
spaces where actors with intersecting interests in education 
overlap (see Fig. 2). These spaces enable participants to 
channel their input and responses into all aspects of policy 
making and policy evaluation. Such a process of constructive 
deliberation differs from the dominant short- and long-route 
approaches to accountability, in which rigid boundaries 
among the three groups are maintained. Structured demo-
cratic voice, when properly applied, creates benefits for all 
involved. Parents, community members and other stakehold-
ers, located outside of the school, are more confident that 
their voices are being respected and heard, which increases 
their trust in the process. Teachers and school leaders benefit 
since the enabling environment to fulfill their responsibilities 
improves. They have more detailed information as to their 
individual responsibilities and are more motivated to address 
the learning needs of students. Additionally, by participating 
in decision-making processes, teachers find that trust in the 
teaching profession improves—educators are seen as knowl-
edgeable and committed. Trust in the process also improves 
since participation leads to a more fair and just education 
system. Finally, the government benefits through increased 
capacity as they are exposed to a variety of perspectives 
and learn from those on the front line of education, which 
ultimately leads to efficiency gains.
While research is needed to identify which conditions 
best support the inclusion of structured democratic voice 
into an accountability system, several obstacles are clear. 
First, capacity among all stakeholders is a concern and can 
lead to situations where, despite the involvement of multiple 
actors, participants may not contribute equally or effectively 
(Martinez et al. 2017). Second, governments may be disin-
terested in incorporating non-official voices in the decision-
making process. Many are not convinced as to the benefits 
of sustained multi-stakeholder engagement.
A long-term commitment to a rigorous participatory pro-
cess may dismay governments (IIEP 2010). To push through 
a new plan or policy through quickly, governments may pre-
fer to limit decision making to more controlled consulta-
tions, few in number. Such actions do little to build capacity 
within government or, importantly, engender ownership or 
commitment from committed actors responsible for deliver-
ing education (Williams and Cummings 2005).
Donors certainly have a complex role to play in this pro-
cess. On one hand, they are deeply convinced of the value 
of accountability, and often support leading accountability 
models, which are embedded in agreements with govern-
ments. On the other hand, they can dominate instances of 
structured democratic voice, pushing out weaker, less articu-
late stakeholders who may feel intimidated in such spaces 
or whose inputs are viewed as less “evidence based” and 
anecdotal. Donors need to consider how best to foster truly 
collaborative, multi-stakeholder arrangements.
Structuring democratic voice in education is a process 
worth pursuing and sustaining. It replaces tokenistic pledges 
from government that allow one-time inputs into decision 
making, and promotes a sustained presence across genera-
tions and changes in political leadership. The collabora-
tive potential of structured democratic voice improves the 
chances that ambitious national and international goals of 
education can be met.
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